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Hunger Strikes

HuNGER STRIKES:
LEGAL R IGHTS OF G UANTJ\ AMO D ETAINEES
Bv: JoN Scorr 1

' 'lam

1.

1\:TRODL'LIIO;-..

slowlr dying in this solitary prison ceU," Omar Deghaycs
told media representatives. " I have no rights, no hope. So
why not take my destiny into my own hands, and die for
a principle?"2 Many of the hundreds of detainees held by the U.S.
government at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba feel similarly towards thei r
detainment. On 11 September 2004, 13'1 detainees went on hunger
strike to protest their incarceration. By October 2005 however, the
U.S. government gladly informed visiting media that the number of
participants had decreased to 25. The government responded by
force feeding 22 of the remaining fasters by .inserting nasogasu·ic
tubes into the detainees' stomachs. 3 The government's current forcefeeding practices violate the detainees' common law right to refuse
unwanted medical treatment by seelcing justification from state
interests that have failed to carry the burden of proof necessary
w supersede the detainees' established rights to hunger strike.
The following assessment of applicable legal principles will
reveal that detainees may claim the right to hunger strike. First, a
recent court r uling shows that the Guantanamo detainees do possess
some substantive constitutional rights, inducting due process of law,
which provides the common law basis for the right to refu se unwanted
medical treatment. Second, the state may potentially apply a few
specific interests to provide the legal basis to force-feed a faster,
1
Jon Scott is a junior at B righam Young UniYersity majoring in Political
Science with a minor in Middle East Studies. He plans on attending law school
and hopes to continue his studies of I Jebrew and J\lidclle East politics. Jon is from
Liberty, ~lissouri.
2
CliYe S. Smith, Git111o's Hungtr Slrikffr, TJ IE JATIO r, at 8, 8 (2005).
3
Susan Okic, Glimpses of Guantanan1o- ~Icdical Ethics and the W'ar on
Terror, 353 NE\X,' ENG. J. MED. 2529, 2530 (2005).
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inclu<.ling: the preservation of life, prevention of suicide, avoiding
manipulation of the justice system, and protecting the integrity of
medical ethics.4 Third, several courts have ruled against the detainees'
ability to hunger strike without even addressing the basis for their
common law rights, allowing the government to negatively portray
the hunger strikers' possible motivations. Fourth, a clear disclosure
of the facts and legal precedent demonstrates that applicable state
interests fail to carry the burden of proof necessary to prevail
against the detainees' right to refuse unwanted medical treatment.

II.

EsTABLiSHED D t::TAINEE RJGHTS

The recent ruling of In 111 Gttantanamo Detainee Cases
has provided the framework under which the constitutional and
historical right to refuse unwanted medical treatment may apply to
the Guantanamo detainees. In the case, the court interpreted Rasul
t! B11sh to declare that the Guantanamo detainees maintain some
constitutional rights concerning their detention and the conditions
of their detention, including the fundamental right to due process
of law under the Fifth Amendment.~ Specifically, the court stated
that the "Supreme Court held that habeas jurisdiction did in fact
exist'' in regards to Guantanamo l:hy and that the "existence of
habeas jurisdiction and substantive constitutional rights were 'directly
tied."'6 This ruling's reference to habeas jurisdiction signified that the
Guamanamo Bay detainees do not exist in a legal void outside the
protection of the United States Constitution, bur rather they do enjoy
some degree of legal standing that includes substantive constitutional
tights. This idea of substantive constitutional rights under due process
4
John Williams, Hunger-Strikes: A Prisoner's Right or a 'Wicked Folly'?
40(3) THE J tOWARD JOUR. 285, 294-2Y5 (2001).
5
Jay ~f. Zitter, Annotation, Rights of Alien Detainees J leld Outside the
United States as to their Treatment and Conditions of D etainment, 6 A.L.R. Fed.
2d 185, 195 (2005).
6
In re Gwlnt;mamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 461 (D.C. Cir.

2005).
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becomes significant because substantive due process, as tlistinct
from procedural due process, guarantees many protections upon the
legal foundation of common law. 7 lt is common law that lays the
basis for the detainees' right to refuse unwanted medical treatment.
Legal scholars have broadly defined common law as guarantees
of "life, liberty, property, and immunities under the protection of
the general rules which govern society."8 These general rules center
around ideals of fairness that have evolved from "history, reason, the
past course of decisions, and stout confidence in the strength of the
democratic faith."'~ Substantive due process refers to fundamental
guarantees beyond mere procedural legal processes to a description
of life that lies beyond the in\'asion of others, including force-feeding
practices. Legal scholars instruct, "The right to refuse medical treatment
or to withhold consent to medical treatment may be protected by the
common law:"10 Therefore, tletainees may exercise their common
Jaw right to hunger strike due to the substantive due process that
the Constitution has permitted them within its habeas jurisdiction.
I .ega! precedent further estabJjshes the constitutional and
historical right to refuse unwanted medical treatment, thus strengthening
the detainees' case concerning their fundamental common law rights.
The Supreme Court in Cruzat7 t! Director, MissotJri Department q( Health
stated, "The principle that a competent person has a constitutionally
protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment may
be inferred from our prior decisions." 11 The same court began its
opinion on Cruzan by quoting a 1891 Supreme Court case that stated,
"No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the
common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and
control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of
7

Donald T. Kramer, Annotatio"' Constinttional Law, 168 A~r JUR 2d 1,

468 (1998).
8
ld. aL478.
9
ld. at 475.
lO
11

T..:tura Dietz, et. al., Annotation, Death, 22A A..\lJUR 2d 101, 476 (2003).
l\£ara Sih•er, Testing Cnt7.an: Prisoners and the Constitutional Question

of Self-Starvation, 58 STAN. L. REV. 631,640 (2005).
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others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law:" 12 This
century-old ruling not only establishes the historical right tO refuse
unwanted medical treatment, but it also shows a strong correlation
between autonomy over one's body and the highest form of libert)~ If
substanth·e due process can claim to protect any liberty under common
law, then surely the Pifth Amendment protects the most sacred of
liberties. In 11'/ashington v. G!ttcksberg, the Supreme Court likewise drew
upon common Jaw precedent to maintain the distinction between
"right ro die" jurisprudence and the state's ban on assisted suicide. The
Court explained, "Given the common-law rule that forced medkation
was a battery, and the long legal tradition p rotecting the decision
to refuse unwanted medical treatment, ou r assumption was entirely
consistent with this nation's history and constitutional traditions." 13
Such common law liberties extend even to a more local level.
The Supreme Court of l owa in Polk Cotmf.Y Shet?ff v. Iou1a District Court
for Polk CotmtJ• similarly "recognized that the [fourteenth] Amendment
gave a competent person a constitutionally protected liberty interest in
refusing unwanted medical treatment." 14 Thus guaranteed freedoms
under substanti'e due process remain consistent at both the federal and
the state levels. All this evidence reveals the depth thatcommonlawrights
have penetrated American society, b()[h temporally and institutionally.
However, the Supreme Court of Iowa also cautioned that such liberty
interests need "to be balanced against countervailing State interests." 15

IT I.

APPUCAI3LE STATE I NTERESTS

When assessing an individual's right to refuse unwanted medical
treatment, justice officials and scholars commonly weigh the influence
of four applicable state interests: the preservation of life, prevention
of suicide, potencial disruption of prison discipline, and protection of
12
13
14

15

Silver, Stlj>m note 11.
ld.
\X'illiams, s11pra note 4, at 290.
ld.
7()
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the medical profession's imegrit:y. 16 HoweYer, under the assumption
that medical professionals have determined the hunger strikers to be
competent, the preYention of suicide does not apply sufficiently to
permit the state to suspend the detainees' common law rights. The law
bas confined the prevention of suicide to "the prevention of irrational
self-destruction, and although the state will act to prevent suicide, merely
declining medical care, e\'en essential treatment, is not considered a
suicidal act or an indication of incompetence."'- Here the law identifies
an important distinction between the right of a rational individual to
refuse life-sustaining treatment and the prohibition on an irrational
individual to terminate their own life. One scholar succinctly correlated
this distinction specifically to hunger strikers by stating" ... tl1e public
policy in pre\·encing suicide is to pre\'ent the irrational loss of life; tl1e
decision of a competent hunger-striking prisoner is not irrationaJ." 18
The Guantanamo Bay detainees provide an excellent example
of how society may deem a competent hunger strike a rational decision.
Israel \~laismei-Manor, a scholar from the University of Haifa, states
that officials should not view a hunger strike as "the act of a crazy
individual, but a rational path that follows some deliberation and is
based on indi,':iduals' socialization and the political action alternatives
open to them." 19 ~ - aismel-Manor provides some possible criteria
that medical professionals may use to determine hunger strikers'
rationality, namely: signs of deliberation, a patient's socialization, and
few available political alternatives. First, the nature of the hunger
strike allows a participant to seriously deliberate the consequences
of their actions because a hunger strike is slow and includes multiple
opportunities to choose whether to improve one's condition by eating
or to continue to refuse offered food. Hunger strike fatalities do not
occur instantly because of one rash choice. Second, the detainees'
Islamic socialization has already incorporated ilie principle of fasting
16
17
18
19
the USA

Williams, supra note 4, at 294-295.
Dietz, supra note 10, at 482-483.
\'\'iUiams, supra note 4, at 291.
Israel \'<'aismel-l\fanor, Striking Differences: Hunger Strikes in Israel and
4 SOCIAL MOVEMENT STUDIES 281, 282 (2005).
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into their lives as an acceptable form of behavior. As an ord1opraxy,
Islam motivates Muslims to show their faith by action, which frequently
includes fasting. Therefore, the dt!tainees may easily resort tO such
behavior as they seek divine intervention in their rughly restrictive
environment. Thjrd, the government has left the detainees with very
few options as a possible response to such a restrictive environment,
prompting the detainees ro make decisions with higher risks. As stated
earlier, Omar Deghayes believed iliat he had no rights and no hope.
Judge Green in In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases explains that by
claiming the right to incarcerate the detainees for the duration of an
ambiguous, potentially multigenerational conflict, the U.S. Executive
Branch has basically sentenced ilie detainees to life imprisonment,
which is the ultimate deprivation of liberty short of the death penalty. 20
The government's actions have extensively undermined the
' 'ery ideal that the common law finds fundamental to our humanity:
liberty. The detainees' current punishment may almost be perceived
as worse than the death penalty because the detainees must li\-e a
life with little or no meaning. The government has not named their
crimes, and therefore, the detainees' punishments have not been fixed
that they might be fulfilled. The government has left the detainees
witl1 very few options beyond the decision of whether or not to
endure a life devoid of incentives to live. Their restrictive detention
provides these t\Iuslim detainees with the reasons to rationally attempt
a hunger strike, and medical doctors already bold the procedures
to determine the competency of a hunger striker. Therefore, only
three of the four possible state interests apply specifically to the
derajnees' common law right to refuse unwanted medical treatment;
though, no argument can completely avoid the prevention of
suicide interest since "generally, the state's interest in preventing
suicide is a natural corollary to its interest in preserving life." 21
Concerning state interests that could apply, military officials at
Guantanamo Bay have sought to reference the preservation of life as
20
In re Guamanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 4-13, 465-466 (D.C.
Cir. 2005).
21
Dietz, Slf/Jra note 10, at, 482.
72
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a justification for force-feeding many of the detainees, emphasi7.ing
a weak commitment to starvation amongst hunger strikers as an
unuttered plea for such preservation. Major General Jay W. Hood,
commander of the Joint Task Force-Guantanamo, has told dsiting
meclia that "consistent with the D epartment of Defense policy the
JTF will prevent unnecessary loss of life by detainees through standard
medical intervention, including involuntary medical intervention
when necessary to overcome a detainee's desire to commit suicide."22
The government feels that such procedures are consistent with
federal prisons' policies in the United States, which "authorize the
involuntary treatment of hunger strikers when there is a dtreat to
an inmate's life or health." 23 Government officials also justify such
responsive action by concluding that the hunger strikers do not
truly desire to terminate their own lives. The government '~ews the
detainees' hunger strikes more as protests than actual attempts to
commit suicide, and d1Us officials assume the responsibiliry to sustain
the detainees' true desires for life. Captain John S. Edmondson, an
emergency physician and the commander over the detainees' medical
care, referring to the camp's hunger strikers stated, "In none of these
[cases] have 1 ever gotten the impression that these guys want to die."24
In regards to another state interest, several courts have ruled
against hunger strikers to avoid possible manipulation of the prison or
justice system by detainees making radical threats of self-destruction.
Scholars be)jeve that prisoners may hunger strike for a variety of ulterior
motives, including frustration, the desire to gain attention for specific
po)jtical beliefs, or the intention to use their health as a bargaining tool
to change their circumstances.25 Justice Lavorato stated the following
concerning inmate hunger strikers: "In most of these cases, the
inmate's main aim was to gain attention from correction officials and
22
El-Banna Y. Bush, 394 F. Supp. 2d 76, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
23
Tim Golden, Guantanamo Hunger Strikers are Force-fed- 'Restraint
Chairs' with Straps, Tubes used to Feed Inmates, N.Y. Tll\fES, February
9, 2006, http:/ I \V\""'sfgate.coml cgibin/ article.cgi?f= / cl ai20U6I02I09 I.
!\.fNGR8HSHLU l.DTL&hw=Guantanamo+ bunger+ strikers&sn=OO l&sc= I000.
24
Okie, mpra note 2, at530.
25
\X'illiams, supra note 4, at 287.
"'3
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sometimes from the public to manipulate the penal system. ln \'irtually
all of these cases, the court allowed force-feeding as a reasonable
response to a threatening disruption of discipline and order in the
penal institution. The common fear was that other inmates might do
the same thing for manipulaLi,·e purposes."~ 1' ComnJonwealth 1: Ka/li11gtr
supporrcc.l this theory and stated that "allowing a prisoner to starve
to death while in state cuscody would have an unpredictable negative
effect on the security and order within the prison system."1- Those
that fear manipulation of rhe penal system seem to hold the belief
that any apparent success by one hunger striker would begin a chain
reaction of hunger strikes, where prisoners would unitedly attempt to
undermme the Yery sentences that seek to enact justice upon them.
Other go...-ernmenr officials justify the force-feeding of hunger
strikers by upholding the inregrity of medical ethics under Hippocratic
principles. ln ConliJJOI11JJectlth v. Kallingp~ a prison psychiatric director
testified that "it would be de\'astating to the staff and rhe staff morale
if they had to allow someone to cease liYing, \ irrually by their own hand,
while under !prison] care."211 The specialist seemed to belie,-e chat health
officials' training has so ingrained the prcsen·ation of Life within their
consciousnesses that any actions against such training would threaten
the health care providers' emotional stability. A nephrologist, in
Commissiomr of Correctionu ,\f)ters, Likewise testified that "metlical ethics
demanded that everything possible be done to ltreat) the defendant 'up
to the point we cannot technically manage it."'2'1 Supporters of such a
position seem ro express a moral imperative that health workers seek
to satisfy to avoid the possible compromising of personnel specifically
trained to save lives. r lowever, these specialists fail to define the
limit of health o fficials' obligations by failing to account for patients'
consent, but medical ethics will assess those limitations momentarily.

26
/d. at 290.
27
~ lam Sill-er, Testing Cruzan: Prisoners ami the Constitutional Question
of Sclf-Stamllion, 58 STA•. L. REV. 631,648 (20US).
28
Siln:r, 111pra note 27, at 652.
29
/d.
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l v.

CORRESPONDJNG STKfE ACTIONS

SeveraJ courts and governmental policy have supported these
state interests in their ruJings and statements against the detainees,
especially favoring the preservation of life and the protection of the
justice system from any manipulation respectively. Judge Bates ruled
in O.K t! Bush that the plaintiffs, referring to the Guantanamo hunger
strikers who sought a stop to being force-fed, carry the burden of
persuasion to "demonstrate a likelihood of injury in the imminent
future in order to secure an injunction."311 Judge Bates later added that
that burden "takes on added importance in a case where the Court is
asked to reguJate the conduct of the Executive in the theater of war." 31
In conclusion Judge Bates declared that "absent a persuasive claim that
the conditions of confinement at Guantanamo are so severe that they
presentanimminentthreatto petitioner's health, the CourtwiJJ notinsert
itself into the day-to-day operations of Guantanamo."32 Interestingly
enough, this judge seems to feel it necessary that the detainees p rove
that the government seeks their harm when the controversy actuaUy
lies with the government's unwillingness to allow detainees to naturally
harm themselves. Later in El-Banna u Bflsh, Judge Louis Oberdorfer
likewise ruJed that "the movants here, like the movant in the O.K. case,
have failed to demonstrate an imminent threat to their health." 33 Such
non-interference into the conduct o f the Executive has allowed the
go,·ernment to term the det..'l.inees' actions as attempts to manipulate
the terms of their detainment. Navy Commander Robert D urand,
a G uantanamo Bay spokesman, recen tly stated, "The hunger strike
technique is consistent with AI-Qaida practice and reflects detainee
attempts to elicit media attention to bring international pressure
on the United States to release them back to the batclefield."34
30
31
32
33
34

EI-Banna '~Bush, 394 F. Supp. 2d 76, 5 (D.C. Cir. 2005).

Id.
ld. at 5-6.
Jd. at 6.

Michael \lelia, More Gitmo Detainees Join Hunger Strike, CBS
8, 2007, http:/ /www.cbsncws.com/stories/2007/U I/08/ap/world/
mainD8.\U LD7KG1.shtml.
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V.

STr\TE l~TERESTI>

Vs. D

ETAl EE R EALITIES AND RiGHTS

A comparison of the realities and rights of the Guantanamo
detainees to the mentioned state interests reveals a situation far more
degrading and oppressive to the hunger strikers than government
officials have described. Concerning the state's interest to preserve
life, first consider that inherent in every individual is a uniqueness that
only freedom of expression can articulate. Such uniqueness prompts
the state to see life as valuable and worth preserving. However, it is
possible that the state may actually diminish the virtue of that life by
seeking to save it. The :Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court stated,
"The constitutional right to privacy .. .is an expression of the sanctity of
i11dividual choke and self-determination as fundamental constituents
of life. The value of life as so perceived is lessened not by a decision
to refuse treatment, but by the failure to allow a competent human
being the right of choice."35 Other legal scholars agree almost verbatim
stating, ''A competent person's common-law and constitutional rights
to forgo life-sustaining treatment do not depend on d1e quality or value
of his or her life and the value of life is lessened not by a decision to
refuse treatment, but by the failure to allow a competent human being
the right of choice."36 Everything worth preserving in life demands
iliat officials respect the rational decisions of individuals. Freedoms,
like the freedom to refuse unwanted medical treatment, lose all meaning
if individuals mar not exercise such freedoms in reality. Humanity's
freedom capabilities separate it from all other creatures, but suppression
may easily allow individuals to lose that "'·hich makes them human.
Instead, government officials have marginalized detainees'
humanity by questioning their resolve to exercise their fundamental
common law rights while simultaneously incarcerating these
individuals in a condition that the previously mentioned court rulings

35
George J. t\nnas, Law and the rife Sciences: Prison Hunger Strikes: W'hy
the Morive Matters 12 THE I IASTINGS CENTER REPORT 21, 22 (1982).
Dietz, strpra note 10, at 532.
36
76
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have termed "the ultimate deprivation of liberty."l7 Surely realizing
their hopeless position, some detainees have e,·en resorted to possible
irrational behavior, which provides a contradicting response to
Captain Edmondson's prc\'ious statement concerning the detainees'
desire to stay alive. The military ad mits that there have been thirtysix suicide attempts by twenty-two Guantanamo detainees as of
November 1, 2005.31.1 One derainee,Jumah Dossari, attempted suicide
by gouging his right arm until it bled and then hanging himself from a
makeshift noose in his cell. f lowever, D ossari's lawyer, who had been
meeting with his client until a few minutes before the suicide attempt,
happened to enter Dossari's ceU in enough time to discover D ossari's
dangerous circumstances and stop his client from losing his life. 39
Then on June 10, 2006, Mani Shaman Turki ai-Habardi AI-Utaybi,
Yassar Tala) Al-Zahrani, and Ali Abdullah Ahmed hung themselves
in their cells and succeeded in taking their own lives.4 Clearly some
of the detainees feel so hopeless about their current situation that
several woukllike to end their suffering. Such evidence also describes
an environment where rational actors may choose to hunger strike,
exercising one of the few political alternatives left to the detainees.
Concerning the undermining of the penal system, Mara Silver,
a graduate from Stanford Law School, finds the state's rulings on
the hunger strikers' ulterior manipulative motives as very ambiguous
and asserts that the law requires states to carry the hea\'iest burdens
of persuasion "before fundamental rights may be restricted."41
Silver finds it interesting that the "Kallinger court jrself admits
that the effect of a faster's death \Vould be, at best, 'unpredictably
negative'."42 Clearly, unpredictable consequences do not provjde the
strong e·..-idence necessary to suppress a common law right. Silver

°

37
In re Guantanamo D etainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443,465-466 (D.C.
Cir. 2005).
38
Okie, mpm note 2, at 2531.
39
40
11. 2006,
41
42

Id.

Associated Press, U.S. identifies Dead Giu11u D etainees, :'.ISNBC.CU;\t,June
http:/ / www.msnbc.msn.com/ id/ 13246132/ .
Silver, .sHpm note 27, at 649.

Id.
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goes on to cite Singletary L~ Costello, in which the Florida District
Court of Appeal ruled that state interest<; could not stop Costello's
hunger strike "given thtre was no e\·idc:nce of actions undermining
security, safety, or welfare within the prison. Rather, 'arguments
concerning the effect of Costello's conduct [werel nothing more than
speculation and conjecrure.'"43 The district court judge then went on
to challenge the theory that a successful hunger strike would start a
chain reaction of multiple coercive fastcrs. He stated, "lt is hard to
imae,~ne that if lCostello] dies as a res\.llt of his actions, that inmates
"''ill be rushing to imitate him."~4 Competent indi,'iduals will surely
back down from permanent consequences if weakly committed to an
action because they still believe that their lives have hope for meaning.
Government officials would also be wise to not minimize
individual rights even in a prison setting, lest society animalizes those
humans who ru:e incarcerated. The Supreme Court has already stated
in T11mer L~ Sa.fo.J• that a prisoner "retains those [constitutional] rights
that are not inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with the
legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system."45 The
Court then later clarified in Johnson l( California that "while 'certain
privileges and rights must necessarily be limited in the prison context,'
rights that need not necessarily be compromised for proper prison
administration are 'not susceptible to the logic of Turner,'" which had
provided a very lax standard for prison regulations. 46 The judge in
Costello understood that a hunger striking prisoner does not disrupt
proper prison administration. An indiYidual that weakens himself
from lack of nourishment cannot easily lead a revolt against prison
security. Furthermore, the Supreme Court, in If: r..!ff v. ll1cDonnell,
"denied the existence of an 'iron curtain' between the Constitution and
the prisons." 47 Legal scholars summarize these principles succinctly

43
44
45
46

47

Silver, supra note 27, at 650.
ld. at 651.
ld. at 641.
ld. at 642.
Williams, sttpra nore 4, at 291.
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by stating, "An inmate's constitutional right to refuse nonconsensual
medical treatment is not vitiated by fact that he or she is incarcerated."~8
Finally, concerning protection of the medical community,
the World Medical Association, an international authority on medical
ethics, has declared that doctors must Jearn to balance the values of
preserving life and being respectful of their patients' autonomy when
presented with a hunger striker as a patient.49 In Singletary l'. Costello,
the court ruled that "patient autonomy and medical ethics are not
reciprocaJs; one does not come at the expense of the other."50 \'<'hen
a patient proves himself or herself competent, then medical ethics
state that the patient holds the power to refuse unwanted medical
treatment. A doctor's obligation to use all available means to presen'e
a patient's life ends where and when a competent patient desires. The
World Medical Association, which includes the American Medical
Association, declared that doctors that agree to attend to a hunger
striker accept all of the "responsibilities inherent in the doctor/patient
relationship, including consent and confidentiality." 51 Then applying
more specifically to the detainees, d1e W.l\LA. has stated, 'Where a
prisoner refuses nourishment and is considered by the physician as
capable of forming an unimpaired and rational judgment concerning
the consequences of such a voluntary refusal of nourishment, he or she
shall not be fed artificially."52 These statements continue to sttengthen
the argument that common law rights may not be easily discarded,
even in extreme circumstances. Just as incarceration cannot instantly
dissolve all fundamental rights, hunger strikes do not operate under
a new framework oudining the doctor-patient relationship. Further
showing the endurance of these basic rights, the W.M.A. has also
48
Dietz, 111pra note 10, at 485-486.
49
World !\fed. Ass'n, Declaration on I lunger Strikers, 43rd World ~led.
Assembly Malta, NoY. 1991.
50
Sih·er, supra note 27, at 652.
51
World .Med. Ass'n, supm note 49.
52
\Xr'orl<.ll\Jed. Ass'n, WI\l.A Declaration of Tokyo: Guidelines for
Physicians Concerning Torture and other Cruel. Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment in Relation to Detention and imprisonment, 29th World Med.
Assembly Tokro, Oct. llJ75.
79
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announced that "medical ethics in times of armed conflict is identical
to medical ethics in times of peace."53 The \'\~M.A. would seem to
argue that the war on terrorism has not relinquished the detainees'
right to refuse unwanted merucaJ treatment through hunger striking.

V1.

CONCLUSION

The goYernment's current actions and policies clearly violate
the detainees' right to refuse unwanted meclical treatment by seeking
justification from state interests that have failed to carry the burden
of proof necessary to supersede the detainees' fundamental common
law rights. The United States justice system has plainly ruled that the
detainees hold substanth·econstitutional rights, including the due process
of law which builds irs foundation upon common la\\~ Furthermore,
common Jaw protects those personal liberties that define the humanity
within an individual, like autonomy over one's person, the most sacred
liberty of all. The government has offered justifications for their forcefeeding practices, but each excuse lacks merit. The government cannot
preserve life by keeping an individual breathing to only oppress the
essence of that individual's humanity later. Life requires freedom of
expression to have meaning. The government cannot claim possible
exploitation of the penal system when hunger strikes do not hinder
t.he proper administration of the prison facility and detainees maintain
their common law rights in prison. Finally the government cannot
raise the banner of medical ethics to heroic proportions where medical
personnel must save lives at all costs when the power of consent gives
the patient the ability to place limitations on medical intervention. lf
the government wishes to continue acting in such an authoritarian
manner toward the Guantanamo prisoners, then it should provide
evidence that gives them that authority. ln the meantime, the detainees
shouJd maintain their common Jaw right to decide their own destiny.
Nonetheless governmen t officials and some courts have yet
to acknowledge that the detainees hold any such rights, sometimes
53
\\'orld ]\fed. Ass'n, Regulations in Times of Armed Con AieL, I Oth World
Med. Assembly H;n-anna, Oct. 1956.
80
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even to the point of absurdity. lt makes little sense that the EIBanna judge required hunger strikers to prm·e that government
actions present an imminent threat to their healtb before a detainee
may exercise his or her established right to end their own life. The
hopelessness of the detainees' indefinite incarceration pnwides an
understandable environment where an indi,·idual may feel it necessary
to exercise such a right, especially if Islamic sociali7.ation strengthens
such a decision's viability. The detainees see no end, and possibly
little reason, to their incarceration. The court, in In re GIICmtanamo
Detainee Cases, referred to Hamdi u Rltmsjeld which applied a Matbe111s
t: Eldtidge analysis where the plurality opinion called detainee private
interests "the most elemental of liberty interests -- tbe interest in
being free from physical detention by one's own go,·ernment."54 The
Court then wisely explained, "There is no practical difference between
incarceration at the hands of one's own government and incarceration
at tbe hands of a foreign governmem; significant liberty is deprived
in both situations regarilless of the jailer's nationality."55 Universal
principles of liberty stretch their jurisdiction across aU boundaries,
hoping to bless all of humanity, but unfortunately, those principles
have yet to improve the lives of tbe detainees in Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba. Meanwhile, legal precedent, unjust incarceration, and medical
ethics all support the rationality of the detainees to hunger strike.
No one's preference should be able to arbitrarily suspend the rights
of another, regardless of the extent of their power in the country.

54

2005).
55

In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 E Supp. 2d 443, 465 (D.C. Cir.
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The final draft of this article was submitted to the production
team prior to the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia that denied certain Constitutional rights to
detainees at the Guantanamo Bay prison.' The nature of the topic
being discussed effects the current legal validity of this argument.
Lawyers for the detainees are planning an appeal to the Supreme Court.2

1
Jee Boumecliene v. Bush, ~o. 05-5062, 2007 U.S. DisL LEXIS 3682
(D.D.C., 2005).
2
David G. Sa,·age, Court Denies Guantanamo Legal Rights, Tm. i'l ·mo:-:
Sot:RCL, February 22, 2007, at A I.
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